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and ground based energy weapons (such as lasers). By using the phrase "directly engaging, defeating or destroying a target," the definition also excludes those systems that only serve as a component or enhancement to another direct delivery system or platform, for example, the role of the Global Positioning System (GPS) in a delivery of a Joint Direct Attack Monition by an aircraft. Beyond these few caveats, I chose not to attempt an exhaustive list of what is and is not included in this definition. The point of this paper is to guide national policy; therefore, this definition is sufficient to proceed with the discussion.
It is also necessary to limit the scope of this policy discussion with respect to the time frame. The question is not will there ever be weapons in space, but should we develop, design and deploy weapons in a time span that a current national security policy could reasonably govern. This is not an exercise in Star Trek science fiction debating "phasers" on the USS Enterprise. It is about current and near-term capabilities and space systems that we could reasonably expect to execute over the next three to five decades.
Most of the international community is on record in favor of preserving space as a weapons free sanctuary. On November 29, 2001, the United Nations General Assembly voted 156-0 to establish the basis for a treaty to ban space-based weapons. 3 In 2000, a similar resolution to prevent an arms race in space passed 163-0. 4 Though these were non-binding resolutions, of the major powers, only the United States and Israel abstained from these votes.
In May 2005, Russia announced it was drafting another United Nations resolution to ensure that outer space is free of weapons. 5 Numerous scientific groups call for peaceful space exploration and the continuation of the current weapons free sanctuary. Many peace organizations are actively opposed to weapons in space and routinely protest outside space related installations.
Given the opposition to space weapons, 17 In this section, I will explore these rationales for acquiring space weapons.
The first case for deliberate acquisition of space weapons is in response to an adversary's threat that cannot be deterred by other means, such as the United States current conventional or nuclear deterrent capability. 18 For this choice to make strategic sense, the United States must strike a balance between these new undeterred adversaries while not upsetting the existing balance with more capable historical adversaries such as Russia. 19 The strategy must also add to the existing deterrence capability of the United States or else we can only assume the United States seeks impunity from attack for the purpose of possible military action against the lesser adversary. For deterrence to work, an adversary must believe that enough of its forces would survive a first strike to inflict sufficient damage on the United States in order to make a first strike inconceivable. The key to deterrence is that both sides are taking a defensive posture. Neither side will strike first because they know the other side is capable of a counter strike that will inflict unacceptable damage. If one side disrupts this "balance" through a combination of space or other weapons, then by definition, deterrence does not exist. Either the adversary will seek to rebalance the equation by improving their capabilities (a defensive posture) or they will seek alternate means to strike first (an offensive posture). If they choose the former, we can conclude they merely hope to prevent aggression from the United States. If they choose the latter, then deterrence is irrelevant because that adversary wants to strike at the United States regardless of our capabilities to respond overwhelmingly. In this case, space weapons add nothing to deterrence capability while potentially they could alter the deterrence equation elsewhere. The undeterred adversary can seek ways to strike that we cannot counter or that are unknown to us, many less complex than missiles and nuclear weapons.
The second case for deliberate acquisition is in response to acquisition of space weapons by another nation. 20 Another nation, whether friend, ally or adversary, may choose to acquire space weapons for any or all of the reasons facing the United States. 21 The United States would have to consider the decision to respond in kind, do nothing, or pressure the other nation to give up its space weapons. The nation in question, the capabilities of the weapons and the extent to which they threaten the United States, would all be factors in selecting a course of action. This also assumes that either the United States is actively pursuing space weapons and
has not yet made a decision to go forward with deployment or that the United States has failed in its leadership to prevent space weapons (as proposed later in this paper).
The third case for deliberate acquisition is in cooperation with other nations. 22 This is more likely a case for a space based missile defensive capability in concert with friends and allies. It would be necessary to take into account the impact on the deterrence equations mentioned earlier. 23 Alternatively, it might be a means for the United States to exert influence and control over another nation independently pursuing space weapons.
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Finally, the United States could make a unilateral decision to acquire space weapons even absent a compelling threat. 25 This scenario relies on the argument that space weapons are inevitable and will be vital to meet national security requirements by maintaining a technological edge over future peer competitors while simultaneously offering greater flexibility in global strike capabilities. 26 Popular literature helps fuel the case for inevitability by making space weapons seem to be on the cusp of reality. As recently as November 1995, Popular
Science ran a cover story with the bold headline, "The New War in Space." 27 This type of rhetoric aside, the case for inevitability is not as strong as some might assume. Will policy makers believe strongly enough in a perceived promise of enhanced national security to alter our current "wait and see" course to one that provides specific direction to pursue space weapons?
The Inevitability of Space Weapons Space weapons are not inevitable. The decision to place weapons in space is a choice, not certainty. Those who argue otherwise point to human nature, historical analogies, economic vulnerability and military necessity to make their case that space weapons are unavoidable. 28 Each of these arguments has merit but none hold up to scrutiny to make a strong case for the inevitability of space weapons.
The human nature argument states that people are warlike and the nation states they run will do whatever is in their national interest, which naturally includes taking weapons wherever they go, including space. 29 The implication is that humans cannot control the tendency to develop and deploy any weapon that could give them an actual or perceived military advantage over an adversary. It should be noted however, that for the last forty-five years space has in fact been free from weapons. 30 If we examine the evolutionary development of the aircraft, we see uncanny parallels to the current evolution of spacecraft… The potential of aircraft was not recognized immediately. Their initial use was confined to observation… Until one day the full advantage of applying force from the air was realized and the rest is history. So too with the business of space… (military) space operations, like the land, sea and air operations that evolved before them will expand (into) the budding new mission already included into the charter of US Space Command…as they become more and more critical to our national security interests.
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On the surface, the logic of historical analogies seems sound but further analysis indicates there is some significant dissimilarity as well.
In the case of Sea Power, militarization followed because the sea transported people and commerce and served as a means for armies to invade enemy lands. 33 Unlike the sea, commerce and people do not transit through space, only information does. While information is vital in today's global economy, it is not solely dependent on space as a medium of transit. The idea of invasion from space is only an issue in Hollywood. As for militarization under the sea, it is important to note that weapons were the first and, for a long time, the only use for subsurface vessels. Their purpose, tied to the surface, was denying the use of the seas for commerce and transport.
The case for Air Power seems more promising as argued by Gen Estes above, but further examination finds some significant flaws as well. One significant difference between air and space is that air is territorial and space is not. 34 Though the two mediums evolved similarly initially, they have not continued to do so. 35 Weaponization of the air took only ten years from the development of the first aircraft. As stated earlier, it has been forty-five years now without the weaponization of space. The development of observation aircraft and bombers necessitated the development of fighters to defend against them; therefore, weaponization of the air was inevitable for the defense of a nation's territory. 36 In contrast, observation and reconnaissance from space has had a stabilizing effect internationally. The freedom of the United States and Russia to see what the other side was doing became so important that it was codified in several arms control treaties. This necessity, in part, led both sides to unilaterally abandoned anti-satellite programs that could threaten the other's reconnaissance satellites, something without precedence in Air Power history.
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The third argument for weapons in space is that there is a threat to the ever-growing For space weapons to be of national security value they must offer the prospect of enhancing the ability to engage targets quickly, anywhere on the globe. However, as we have seen in recent years, the ability to strike targets is only part of the equation. We must also be able to project forces to achieve national objectives (i.e., boots on the ground). As with Air
Power, Space Power has no ability to take ground and hold it. Precision strikes, whether from aircraft or from space, are only as reliable as the intelligence on the target. With freedom of action in the skies over Iraq in the opening act of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the USAF was quickly able to guide bombs onto targets suspected of harboring Saddam Hussein. The strikes failed to kill the Iraqi leader and served only to highlight the ineffectiveness of this type of surgical strike from the air while creating international outrage over using 2,000 lb bombs to kill one man regardless of the collateral damage inflicted. It took months and thousands of troops in Iraq to find Saddam Hussein hiding in a hole underground. Space weapons would not likely enhance the effort to hunt down and kill rogue state leaders or terrorists. Conceivably, space to ground kinetic weapons could provide a more agile global strike capability than Air Power alone, especially in areas of the world where forces are not pre-positioned. 43 A full constellation of space weapons would be necessary to achieve this goal. A typical low earth polar-orbiting satellite only passes over the same location on the earth's surface once every 12 hours. To ensure agile global strike capability, many satellites would be necessary. The Global Positioning System requires a minimum of 24 satellites at medium earth orbit (11,000 nautical miles) to achieve global navigational coverage. To achieve global communication coverage at a low earth orbit, the Iridium satellite constellation employs 66 satellites. How many satellites
(and at what cost) would be necessary to achieve a truly agile global strike capability?
Assuming good intelligence on the target and satellites overhead, there would still be delays for the command and control apparatus to obtain approval to strike a target. Would the president grant a combatant commander authority to strike a target in any nation without taking time to consider political ramifications? Time is another enemy of a quick strike success. Space weapons could end up an expensive scheme to kill "targets of opportunities" with results no more effective than an aircraft armed with guided weapons.
Given the likely cost of space weapons, they are a poor replacement for existing conventional strike capability to engaging targets in a nation with which the United States was engaged in hostilities. "Shock and Awe" from space would be a far more expensive tactic than using existing conventional capabilities and much harder to sustain. That leaves missile defense and counter space as the other possible national security enhancement for space weapons. As previously discussed, space based missile defense requires a careful calculation of the effects it has on the balance of deterrence across the spectrum of potential adversaries. 48 The program has repeatedly breached the "Nunn-McCurdy" 25 percent program acquisition unit cost growth limit requiring the Air Force to meet certain recertification criteria for the program to continue. 49 Costs aside, the original launch date of the first SBIRS-high satellites has repeatedly been delayed. The EELV has seen a similar explosion in costs. Originally billed as the follow-on to existing satellite launch boosters with the goal of reducing the government's total launch cost by half, it was targeted to cost $18.8 billion. 50 Today, Congressional reports peg the projected cost just shy of $32 billion. 51 This is not intended to question the need for either SBIRS or EELV, but only to point out that projected costs and capabilities of space systems present a real and significant budgetary risk. At a time when the Air Force is proposing early retirement for all F-117 fighters, half its B-52 fleet and elimination of U-2 reconnaissance assets in an effort to boost spending for the new F-22 fighter jets, it is hard to imagine one can find value in the need for exotic space weapons. 52 Space is a fragile weapons platform. For defense, space is as static as an earth bound fortification. 53 It takes a great amount of energy to achieve a particular orbit and it is both time and energy consuming to change an orbit. 54 As a result, satellite systems are typically deployed in constellations requiring large numbers and increased expense to achieve global coverage.
Like a weakness in a fortification, this allows an adversary to concentrate on one point and potentially overwhelm the system. 55 Space systems reside in stable, observable and predictable orbits. The laws of orbital mechanics govern their motion. A satellite's presence is observable through the electro-optical spectrum. Therefore, an adversary will likely know the precise current and future location of any satellite system. Command, control and logistics are expensive and complex. Command and control nodes provide terrestrial targets as necessary to the overall systems function as the space based segment. The cost per pound to place objects in orbit is very high and launches occur from a few static terrestrial locations. Command and control relies on terrestrial networks subject to jamming or destruction. Maintenance, refueling and rearming (if necessary) are impractical or, at best, orders of magnitude more difficult than for aircraft.
The Potential Adversaries
Are space weapons necessary to counter adversaries? The environment in which the United States might choose to develop and deploy space-based weapons is complex. In making the decision, policy makers must take into account the reaction and response of potential adversaries with a wide array of capabilities with the ultimate goal of increasing national security. At one end of the spectrum lies Russia, with its large and diverse, if somewhat decaying, strategic arsenal and significant space capabilities. One-step below is China, with less capable and stationary strategic forces, but growing space capabilities. At the bottom tier are the so-called rogue states such as North Korea and Iran, with limited, but growing missile and nuclear forces and virtually non-existent space capabilities. Finally, the United States must also consider the impact on the Global War on Terrorism. This section examines the dynamic of space weapons on these potential or existing adversaries.
Russia is clearly concerned about the potential pursuit of space weapons by the United
States. As previously mentioned, Russia is leading the charge in the United Nations to prevent the weaponization of space. Despite their concern, Russia has perhaps the least to worry about if the United States develops and deploys these weapons. 56 It is possible that even with a small space based defensive combined with ground-based defenses that are currently under development and deployment, it would not upset the strategic deterrence balance between the United States and Russia. 57 Undoubtedly, however, they would be compelled to respond.
Flush with revenues from crude oil sales, Russia has embarked on a program to upgrade its strategic deterrence capabilities. In a direct response to American ground based missile defense activities, Russia is developing maneuverable re-entry vehicles for its nuclear arsenal designed to foil these ground-based systems. 58 This is clearly a defensive posture designed to preserve the perceived balance of deterrence. In reaction to a space-based component of missile defense, Russia would evaluate the threat and again, likely respond in some manner.
How that response would manifest itself is unknown. Russia could respond in kind with their own space-based systems, they could develop anti-satellite capabilities to attack opposing space systems or they could further increase the capabilities of their strategic forces in an effort to overwhelm the system. Alternatively, Russia or any other potential adversary, might publicly link the use of space-based weapons to the first use of nuclear weapons in the same way that the United States and others have lumped chemical, biological and nuclear weapons into the category of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). 59 If that categorization took root internationally, it could have the effect of significantly raising the stakes for using the weapons rendering a space weapons as politically impotent as our stockpile of chemical weapons.
Like Russia, China would need to evaluate the threat space weapons pose to their national security and respond accordingly. With a less mobile, more static strategic nuclear force, China may have less assurance than Russia that their forces could survive a first strike.
If they perceive retaliatory forces could not penetrate a combined space and ground based missile to inflict enough damage to provide deterrent, space based defense may drive them to rapidly advance the capabilities of their strategic forces, increasing numbers, modernizing reentry systems and improving mobility. Regarding the most likely point of future conflict with China, the issue of Taiwan, any offensive or defensive space system that improves the United
States' ability to project force in the western Pacific Ocean will be seen as a threat. As a growing space power, China is perhaps in the best position to pose a threat to American space dominance. Regardless of our actions, China may pursue means to attack or defeat our space systems (weaponized or otherwise), but by developing space weapons first, the United States surely invites that conclusion. The first step is leadership in setting the intended standard. As the world's only superpower, and the one nation in the best position to weaponize space, by not doing so we may pave the way to ensure it never happens. 60 Our current relative dominance in space gives the United States unique credibility in leading an international effort to limit space weapons, as the nation with presumably the most to give up. It would be easy for Peru to give up space weapons. Since they have no near-term prospects for a space program, they really are not giving up anything tangible. By renouncing space weapons, the United States is giving up something real and tangible. This can have the effect of setting a very high international value on preserving space as a weapons free sanctuary. Initially, the United States should announce a policy of unilateral constraint in the development and deployment of weapons in space. 61 From this position of strength, we should pursue and shape comprehensive and verifiable international conventions that limit weapons in space. The strength comes from a combination of our technological dominance in space and our leadership position in the world. As discussed, space weapons are a choice. If the United States, through international leadership, places great value on a space sanctuary, it increases the international pressure for others to follow suit.
It also raises the political ramifications of any nation's violation of the sanctuary or unwillingness to participate in the conventions. If, on the other hand, the United States acts as the pioneer for space weapons, not only do we pay the political cost of breaking the sanctuary of space, but we also reduce the cost (political and economic) of entry to those who follow. 62 Restraint increases the pressure for others to restrain as well. Failing restraint, should another space capable country be unwilling to sign and comply with the conventions and later develop space weapons, it would greatly enhance the political environment for the United States to counter any threat including a greater likelihood of having partners, political and otherwise, in the process. 
Conclusion
Military use of space is necessary, and protecting the peaceful use of space is vital to the United States' national security. The argument that the military uses space assets to enhance its capabilities on the land, air and sea and the fact that those assets are vulnerable does not make a compelling case for weaponization of space. Space systems are too fragile to serve as an effective weapons platform. Offensive counter-space is less complex than defensive counter-space and the United States has the most to lose from a shooting war in earth orbit.
Deterrence, not space-base missile defense, is the best approach to counter the threat of strategic ballistic missiles across the spectrum of potential adversaries. Security gained by these systems against less capable adversaries, which would be limited at best, is less than the adverse affects they would have on the balance of deterrence elsewhere. Finally, the United
States is unlikely to enhance its global strike and global reach capabilities at a reasonably affordable cost or with results more effective than current conventional capabilities provide. The best course of action for a new space policy is reducing our vulnerability by decreasing our reliance on space assets and preserving space as a weapons free sanctuary.
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